

# Keep in mind

~How we responded to "the heavy rain disaster in July 2018"~



国土を整え、全力で備える

国土交通省  
中国地方整備局

Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism  
Chugoku Regional Development Bureau

# Contents

Historic heavy rain, Levee failure, Sediment-related mass movement disaster, Road network was cut everywhere

- ◆ Historic heavy rain that we have ever seen . . . 2
- ◆ Human casualties and Building damages in five prefectures, Chugoku region. . . 3
- ◆ The Highest Water Level which passed observation records . . . 4
- ◆ Flood Disaster in five prefectures, Chugoku region. . . 5
- ◆ Levee failure in several areas Large-scale floods . . . 6
- ◆ Sediment-related mass movement disaster in five prefectures, Chugoku region . . . 7
- ◆ Road network scissored in five prefectures, Chugoku region . . . 8
- ◆ Knocked down transportation infrastructure . . . 9

## As soon as practical

- ◆ By every conceivable means Map out disaster situation immediately . . . 1 1
- ◆ TEC-FORCE operation mobilized from all around the nation . . . 1 2
- ◆ Concerted development of drainage pump vehicle  
    Flooding was pumped back rivers around the clock . . . 1 3
- ◆ Reopen the roads for a recovery  
    Team formation and road clean-ups in Mabi . . . 1 4

Make efforts toward a timely restoration from the disaster damage

- ◆ The function of failed banks was restored in two weeks after the failure . . . 1 6
- ◆ Turning a parking area into the by passing detour,  
    the blocked section of the road was reopened sooner than expected . . . 1 7
- ◆ Floating garbage on the sea traffic  
    Secure the safety of an ocean lane by a marine environment maintenance ship . . . 1 8

## Our Support

- ◆ Liaison were put in place for the affected local municipalities . . . 2 0
- ◆ Sediment removal in rivers and road clean-ups, support for affected local municipalities . . . 2 1
- ◆ Prevention for health damage The dust prevention countermeasures by water sprinkler trucks . . . 2 2
- ◆ Providing drinking water Relief supplies transport by ships . . . 2 3
- ◆ Everyone wanted to know where “the passable routs” were . . . 2 4

## Our Duty

- ◆ Asahi River flood control waterway reduced flood damage significantly . . . 2 6
- ◆ The Sabo dam contained debris flows and driftwoods. . . 2 7
- ◆ Rerouting over a wide area linking Hiroshima to Kure:  
    Higashihiroshima-Kure Expressway . . . 2 8
- ◆ The Expressway double network . . . 2 9

## For the better future

- ◆ Emergency Sabo work . . . 3 1
- ◆ Emergency flood control measure . . . 3 2
- ◆ Support team for the reconstruction of town and houses . . . 3 3

The damage to Chugoku region  
in “the heavy rain disaster in July 2018.”

# Historic heavy rain


# Levee failure

# Sediment-related mass movement disaster



# Road network was cut everywhere

# Historic heavy rain that we have ever seen


Rainfall records in a 24-hour period, a 48-hour period, and 72-hour period were passed at tens of observation points around Okayama and Hiroshima. On this downpour, “Special heavy rain warnings” were issued in three prefectures : Tottori, Okayama and Hiroshima.



平成30年7月3日0時～8日12時までの期間降水量：気象庁より



# Human casualties and Building damages in five prefectures, Chugoku region









place	damage to citizens			damage to buildings					The maximum number of evacuees
	The dead	Missing	The injured	Completely destroyed	Half destroyed	Partially destroyed	Flooding above floor	Flooding below floor	
	Number of people	Number of people	Number of people	Number of buildings	Number of buildings	Number of buildings	Number of buildings	Number of buildings	Number of people
Tottori	0	0	0	0	0	3	7	54	1,324 (July 7)
Shimane	0	0	0	55	127	2	0	61	923 (July 7)
Okayama	61	3	161	4,822	3,081	1,108	2,921	6,035	4,787 (July 8)
Hiroshima	109	5	138	1,085	3,258	1,996	3,234	5,603	11,707 (July 7)
Yamaguchi	3	0	13	21	448	95	135	653	41 (July 7)

Source: The damage due to “The Heavy Rain in July 2018” (as of October 9, 2018) (CAO)

# The Highest Water Level which passed observation records

## Legend

-  A river which marked the top in recorded history.
-  A river which surpassed an alarming level that could trigger floods or judge of evacuation.
-  A dam which can reduce the flood damage by accumulating a part of floods.
-  A dam which can accumulate water in case of flood.
-  A spot which recorded the highest water level.




# Flood Disaster

## in five prefectures, Chugoku region

The record rainfalls flowed into rivers to burst their banks, causing large-scale floods.

Levee failures: 36  
 Number of inundated houses: about 34,800  
 Flooded areas: about 8,000ha

【Mihara City, Hiroshima】Nuta River collapsed its levee.



**Legend of disaster area**

- Burst prefecture's levees
- Burst country's levees



【Mabi Town, Kurashiki City, Okayama】Oda River collapsed its levee.

【Places of burst levees in Chugoku region】

Prefecture	Name of river system (Number of burst levees)
Shimane	Yato River (1)
Okayama	Asahi River (2) Takahashi River (15)
Hiroshima	Ashida River (3) Hongo River (1) Nuta River (8) Kamo River (1) Noro River (3) Kurose River (1)
Yamaguchi	Shimada River (1)


(Source: MLIT Japan, as of September 5, 2018 at 15:00)

# Large-scale floods

Levee failure in several areas

Historic rainfalls have caused rivers to overtop their levees, causing large-scale floods.

8 sections of levees including Odagawa River of Takahashigawa river system **failed** at Mabi Town in Okayama. The flooded areas were about **1,200ha**, and the greatest depth of floods was estimated to be about **5m**.



**Levees succumbed at 36 sections of 10 river system  
4 prefectures in Chugoku region.**

Flood situation, at Mabi Town, Kurashiki City, Okayama



# Sediment-related mass movement disaster in five prefectures, Chugoku region.

Mass movements and landslides in various parts of Chugoku region have recorded the highest death toll in Japan since 1988. About **1,500** mass movements were seen. The road was terribly damaged, affecting commercial distribution and regional economy. Significant sediment wash-out has reached downstream hillside business and residential areas. The damages were worsened due to scattered sedimentation.



【Yasuura Town, Kure City, Hiroshima】 landslide



【Mizushiri, Saka Town, Aki District, Hiroshima】 landslide




【Chikanori, Takahashi City, Okayama】 debris

Number of sediment-related mass movement disasters: 1,512

( Source: MLIT Japan, as of October 9, 2018 )


- 土石流等 Debris flow
- がけ崩れ Hillside failure
- 地すべり Landslide



【Sediment-related mass movement disasters damage in decades (case of the top 3 death toll)】

Storm name	The death toll	Disaster area
The Heavy Rain in July 2018	118名	広島県、岡山県
Typhoon Talas in 2011	78名	和歌山県、奈良県、三重県
The Heavy Rain in 2014 (2014 Hiroshima landslides)	77名	京都府、兵庫県、広島県

【Comparison with 2014 Hiroshima debris flows (in Hiroshima)】




Keep in mind

~How we responded to "the heavy rain disaster in July 2018"~

# Road network scissored

## in five prefectures, Chugoku region

The major east-west highway, Sanyo Expressway and National Highway 2, were severely damaged because of mass washout or slope protection collapse.



- Expressways had been lifted traffic closed by September 21.
- National highway under the direct control of MLIT had been lifted by July 21.
- Auxiliary national highways and local roads had been lifted about 80% of traffic closed by October 15.



**Traffic closed due to the loss of riverbank protection**  
 [Aki Ward, Hiroshima City, Hiroshima] (National Highway 2)



**Mass washout and driftwood inflow out of the road**  
 [Higashihiroshima City, Hiroshima] (Sanyo Expressway (Around Takaya IC, JCT))

Hillside failure,  
Washout of bridge,  
Slope Protection failure

Hillside failure at Mizushiri (Saka Town, Aki District, Hiroshima) knocked down “Hiroshima-Kure road,” “Kure Line (JR West),” and “National highway 31” at the same time that transportation infrastructures links between Hiroshima and Kure were lost.


Prefectural roads in Chugoku region were also damaged and the road traffic were closed in many areas. Survivors in need of help and support in disaster areas were forced to wait days.

Knocked down transportation infrastructure



【Saka Town, Aki District, Hiroshima】  
Landslide damaged to national highway 31

About 800 points of roads were so severely damaged that disaster survivors were forced to wait.



**July in 2018**  
**The operations**  
**From the outset of disasters**  
**to the emergency recovery**

**Our best**

**to bring back normal daily lives**

**as soon as practical**

By every conceivable means  
Map out disaster situation immediately

Chugoku Regional Development Bureau have captured the whole picture of damages by **Emergency response helicopter** since July 8.

We enumerated required demands based on detailed disaster lookout taken by UAV(drone), which provided **real time images** of miniature cameras via satellite communication equipment.



Real time observation by a satellite communication equipment(Ku-SAT II)



Investigation of disaster situation by drone



Real time observation by a satellite communication car

# TEC-FORCE operation

## mobilized from all around the nation

The personnel of TEC-FORCE corps mobilized for “the heavy rain disaster in July 2018” were **6,163 person-day**. (From July 5 to September 21)

This effort is ranked third next to “Great East Japan Earthquake of March 11, 2011” (18,115 person-day) and “the 2016 Kumamoto earthquake.” (10,912 person-day)



**TEC-FORCE carried out technical support immediately for early recovery in disaster stricken areas.**



【Ashidagawa River, Hiroshima】Survey of damage situation



【Yoshiura, Kure City, Hiroshima】Survey of sediment washout



【Shinjo Town, Takehara City, Hiroshima】Survey of damage situation (July 9)

**Flooding was pumped back rivers around the clock**  
**Concerted deployment of drainage pump vehicle**


Right on the day flood disaster occurred in July 7, we **massed drainage pump vehicles** to Mabi Town, Kurashiki City, Okayama from all around the nation. We managed to start the drainage operation, keeping up day-in and day-out, by 23 fleets since July 8, and accomplished its operation on July 11.

The amount of drained flood water was not less than 700,000m<sup>3</sup>.

This is about 2,000 times as much as 25m swimming pool.



【Mabi Town, Kurashiki City, Okayama】  
The drainage operations were put in place.



# Team formation and road clean-ups in Mabi

## Reopen the roads for a recovery

There were left-out cars and huge amount of sediment on roads in flood areas after levees failure.

We formed a team, “TEC-FORCE: road clean-ups in Mabi Town” in two days after levee failure, and started to reopen community roads as emergency flood water pump out operations were finished.

At last, we were able to clean out sediment on highways in July 15.



**Dispatching clean-up operation machines to flooded area to remove left-out automobiles and sediment from the areas as soon as practical.**



【Mabi Town, Kurashiki City, Okayama】  
sediment heaps in a flood area



【Mabi Town, Kurashiki City, Okayama】  
removing operation of left out cars



Our operations for recovery  
in response to “The Heavy Rain disaster in July 2018”

Make efforts  
toward a timely restoration  
from the disaster damage

# The function of failed banks was restored in two weeks after the failure

In anticipation for the next one,  
we had to restore the banks emergently.

Under repairs, Oda River levee (Mabi Town, Kurashiki City, Okayama)  
Photo: 15 July 2018



Photo: 8 July



Photo: 11 July



Photo: 15 July



Photo: 21 July




Under repairs around the clock

# Turning a parking area into the by passing detour, the blocked section of the road was **reopened sooner than expected.**

Just after the disaster (Photo: 9 July 2018)



After the maintenance of the detour (Photo: 12 July 2018)




July 6  
22:00  
National Highway 31  
**Blocked**

Only after **5 days**

The maintenance of the bypassing detour

July 11  
23:00  
**Reopened**



The landslide damage to “National Highway 31,” “Hiroshima Kure road,” and “Kure Line (JR WEST),” and transportation infrastructures links Hiroshima to Kure were disrupted. We replaced the parking area of a swimming beach with a diversion.

By passing detoured section (Parking of a beach)

Beach

July 22, 2018 photograph taken from an helicopter in flight (Mizushiri, Kure City, Hiroshima)

# Floating garbage on the sea traffic Secure the safety of an ocean lane by a marine environment maintenance ship

“The heavy rain disaster in July 2018” brought a large amount of driftwood and debris to Hiroshima Bay and the Inland Sea.

For the safety of ocean lane, we collected driftwood and floating debris by collected marine environment maintenance ships. The amount of debris reacted well over **1,700m<sup>3</sup>**. This amounts to the entire debris collection of the last year (2017).



**To secure the safety of an ocean lane and transport relief supplies**




Our support to the affected areas  
of “the heavy rain disaster in July 2018”

# Our Support

# Liaison were put in place for the affected local municipalities

Chugoku Regional Development Bureau dispatched **liaison, emergency disaster prevention measures members** to proactively survey required demands of affected autonomy. We prepared various support operations and shared the information of disaster and its recovery situation.

**794 liaison members** sent to 17 municipalities and to an institution from July 5 till August 31.



Sharing information at Hiroshima prefectural office



Preparation of supports at Kurashiki city hall

# Sediment removal in rivers and road clean-ups, support for affected local municipalities




From July 20, the day that emergency recovery operations of rivers and roads under our direct control were achieved, we started to remove sediments and repair roads. We cooperate with the self-defense forces, fire fighters and municipalities in doing recovery support of disaster areas.



Respond to demand of local municipalities, we supported to remove sediments and repair the roads.

## Disaster affected areas and municipalities under our support (5 cities, a town, 9 districts)



In affected areas, remarkable increase of **dust** was caused by operating **fleets** for restoration.

We added **road sweepers** and **water sprinkler trucks** again from all over the nation to affected areas specifically to Mabi Town.

Sprinkling water on affected areas to control dust cloud  
Care for the health of flood survivors

【Mabi Town, Kurashiki City, Okayama】

# Prevention for health damage

The dust prevention countermeasures by water sprinkler trucks



We provided **potable water supplies** for damaged areas without water supply which saw **difficulty in accessing** clean water such as islands or isolated districts.



【Kamagari Bay, Kure City, Hiroshima】  
Supply drinking water to survivors


# Providing drinking water Relief supplies transport by ships

# Everyone wanted to know where “the passable routes” were

Because traffic restriction was extended for a long time with too many “dots” signing closed traffic, phone calls for the passable routes saw a tremendous increase.

Therefore, we made “Passable Map” which showed people traffic restriction and passable routes at hand. We were able to respond to the needs of traffic users.

## Passable Map around Hiroshima and Kure



### 【Legend】

- ×
  - 
  -
- : Closed areas because of the disaster  
: Impassable way  
: Passable way

Infrastructures  
stood for what they were meant  
on “the heavy rain disaster in July 2018”

# Our Duty




# Asahi River flood control waterway reduced flood damage significantly.

The water level at Shimomaki water level observatory where locating in the upper stream of Asahi River flood control waterway in Okayama **surpassed an alarming level that could trigger major floods.**



On 6 July, the observatory allowed water to divest into water way in order to reduce the flood impact. It succeeded in lowering the Asahi River's water level by divesting flow into waterway at a rate of 1,300m<sup>3</sup>/s. (The rate was 4,500m<sup>3</sup>/s before the diversion) Finally, the water level dropped below 1.5m.

If it had not been for Asahi River flood control waterway, it could have been overflowing the bank, which might have caused damages to 450ha and 5,050 houses in central Okayama City.

【Inundation hazardous area in case Asahi River flood control waterway were not at work.】




# The Sabo dam



# Rerouting over a wide area linking Hiroshima to Kure: Higashihiroshima-Kure Expressway

Higashihiroshima-Kure Expressway and Sanyo Expressway were utilized as a reroute. The traffic was 1.2 times heavier than normal during the Expressway closing.



The required time to Hiro, Kure-shi: if you take Higashihiroshima-Kure Expressway, you can save an hour.

発着: 広島(広島BC)、呉市広付近(阿賀IC)

7月18日、8月21日に実施したプローブカー調査による所要時間

国道31号経由については、一般道、都市高速(宇品~仁保)、広島呉道路(仁保~坂北)、国道31号を利用

東広島呉道路経由については一般道、山陽道、東広島呉道路を利用

3hは6:00~9:00の3時間

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# The Expressway


# double network

Sanyo Expressway, a main corridor linking East and West was blocked. However, the function of wide-area traffic was kept thanks to Chugoku Expressway and San-in Expressway. (Chugoku Expressway was reopened earlier because the section of the damaged area was converted from four-way traffic to two-way traffic for traffic users.)

Chugoku Expressway (Hokubō~Niimi)  
Through two-way traffic,  
traffic close was lifted early.




- 高速道路
- 国道
- 通行止め区間 (7/14時点)
- 通行止め解除済み区間 (7/17 15時時点)
- ✕ 土砂等流入



【Traffic change of Sanyo Expressway, Chugoku Expressway and Sanin Expressway】


## 全車 All vehicles

Sanyo Expressway (Kouchi~Hiroshima)  
Blocked from July 6 ~ till at 6:00, July 14



## 大型車 Large vehicles

Sanyo Expressway (Kouchi~Hiroshima)  
Blocked from July 6 ~ till at 6:00, July 14



山陰道 中国道 山陽道

The operations for restration  
in the aftermath of “The Heavy Rain  
disaster in July 2018”

# For the better future



# Emergency Sabo works

## Hiroshima

At nine local communication which suffered heavy sediment-related damage from “The Heavy Rain in July 2018” in Hiroshima, we started works to mitigate in-coming sediment hazard, caused by upstream leftovers.





Natural damming of the lower Souzu River due to landslide

○Emergency restoration by strong wire net



【Kuchitaminami, Asaminami Ward, Hiroshima-shi】  
An operation of emergency measures by wire net (completed in October 2018)





# Emergency flood control measure

Mabi Town, Kurashiki City, Okayama

■ We set out emergency river improvement works for the alleviation of the disaster, “The heavy rain in July 2018.” (This is what is called “special emergency projects for the control of severe river disasters.”) The relocation of Oda River’s confluence, bank and its protection works have already started.

■ Besides these structural measures, on “the natural disaster reduction conference of Takahashi River system in face of large-scale floods, related organizations are supposed to cooperate with each other and to add non-structural measures.

【合流点付替えにより小田川の水位を軽減】



Keep in mind

~How we responded to “the heavy rain disaster in July 2018”~

# Support team for the reconstruction of town and houses

In order to support affected municipalities toward “Reconstruction of the town and houses” from “The heavy rain disaster in July 2018,” we organized the support team for the “Reconstruction for town development / house construction in Chugoku region.”

## 【Our immediate operations】

- To make consultation for affected local municipalities
- To give advice to autonomy about the disaster situation and the project which corresponds to their demands
- To give advice to autonomy which consider the plan of “Reconstruction for town development / house construction
- To visit affected autonomy and exchange ideas to grasp their demands carefully
- To cooperate and share information with the ministry proper and relevant organizations

**Support local municipalities  
toward the early restoration**



【Initial field survey of affected areas】  
Confirm the damage situation in Tenou area, Kure City



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